UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

10-6-2016

State v. Bobolack Respondent's Brief Dckt. 44170

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Bobolack Respondent's Brief Dckt. 44170" (2016). Not Reported. 3324.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/3324

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
) No. 44170
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
) Ada County Case No.
v.
) CR-MD-2015-4113
)
CHARLINE J. BOBOLACK,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
)
________________________
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA
________________________
HONORABLE GERALD F. SCHROEDER
District Judge
________________________
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

RANDALL S. BARNUM
Barnum Howell & Gunn, PLLC
P. O. Box 2616
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 336-3600

KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case................................................................................... 1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ........................ 1
ISSUES ................................................................................................................ 4
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 5
I.

Bobolack Has Failed To Show The District Court
Erred In Affirming The Magistrate Ruling On The
State’s Motion In Limine .................................................................. 5
A.

Introduction .......................................................................... 5

B.

Standard Of Review ............................................................. 5

C.

Bobolack Has Failed To Show An Adverse
Ruling Subject To Challenge On Appeal .............................. 6

D.

Even If The Magistrate’s Ruling Was Adverse
To Bobolack, She Failed To Make An Offer Of
Proof Of Any Evidence That Was Excluded At
Trial, And Therefore Failed To Preserve A
Record For Appealing The Magistrate’s Ruling .................. 11

E.

Alternatively, Even If The Magistrate’s Ruling
Was Adverse And Properly Preserved For
Review, The District Court Correctly Affirmed
The Magistrate’s Decision To Exclude Evidence
That Was Unfairly Prejudicial, Confusing, Or
Needlessly Cumulative ....................................................... 18

F.

Alternatively, Even Assuming The Magistrate’s
Ruling Was Adverse, Properly Preserved For
Review, And Erroneous, The Error Was Harmless ............ 20

i

II.

Bobolack Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred
In Affirming The Jury’s Verdict ...................................................... 22
A.

Introduction ........................................................................ 22

B.

Standard Of Review ........................................................... 22

C.

There Was Sufficient Evidence That Bobolack
Maliciously And Willfully Disturbed The Peace .................. 23

CONCLUSION.................................................................................................... 26
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .............................................................................. 26

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Gunter v. Murphy’s Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16, 105 P.3d 676 (2005) ................ 6
Krempasky v. Nez Perce Cty. Planning & Zoning,
150 Idaho 231, 245 P.3d 983 (2010) ......................................................... 6
Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008).................................. 6
Morris By & Through Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 138,
937 P.2d 1212 (1997) .............................................................................. 11
Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981) .................................... 6
State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 184 P.3d 215 (Ct. App. 2008) ........................ 5, 6
State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 205 P.3d 1185 (2009) ........................................... 18
State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 735 P.2d 1070 (Ct. App. 1987) ............................ 23
State v. Joslin, 145 Idaho 75, 175 P.3d 764 (2007) ........................................... 11
State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991) ....................... 23
State v. Marsh, 153 Idaho 360, 283 P.3d 107 (Ct. App. 2011) ........................... 22
State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 955 P.2d 603 (Ct. App. 1997) ............................ 22
State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378, 195 P.3d 737 (Ct. App. 2008) ........................ 25
State v. Pickens, 148 Idaho 554, 224 P.3d 1143 (Ct. App. 2010) ........................ 6
State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 253 P.3d 754 (Ct. App. 2011) ................................. 6
State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992) .......................... 22
State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 248 P.3d 720 (2010) ........................................... 18
State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 119 P.3d 653 (Ct. App. 2005) ............... 20
State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 29 P.3d 949 (2001) .......................................... 11
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996) ........................................ 10

iii

STATUTES

PAGE

I.C. § 18-6409(1) ................................................................................................ 23
RULES
I.C.R. 52 ............................................................................................................. 20
I.R.E. 103 ..................................................................................................... 11, 20
I.R.E. 401 ........................................................................................................... 10
I.R.E. 403 ........................................................................................................... 18

iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Charline J. Bobolack appeals from the district court’s order on the state’s
motion in limine and from the district court’s order affirming the judgment of
conviction.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Bobolack was involved in a profane verbal altercation near a bowling
alley. (Tr., p. 52, L. 14 – p. 76, L. 9.) She was subsequently charged with
disturbing the peace in Ada County Case number CR-MD-2015-0004113.
(R., pp. 5-7, 44-45.)

The complaint alleged that Bobolack “did willfully and

maliciously disturb the peace or quiet of a person, Sara Giambruno, by engaging
in offensive conduct in a loud and boisterous manner.” (R., pp. 44-45.)
Prior to trial, the state filed a motion in limine seeking an order “precluding
the defendant from producing any evidence related to the (1) victim’s criminal
history and current status as a supervised probationer, (2) allegations as to the
victim stalking the Defendant, (3) allegations as to the victim vandalizing the
Defendant’s property, and (4) allegations as to the victim harassing or
threatening the Defendant.” (R., pp. 37-39.) The parties agreed to exclude the
first category of evidence, but contested whether the latter three categories of
alleged stalking, vandalism, and harassment evidence—referred to below and
herein as the “stalking evidence”—should be allowed at trial. (See R., p. 41;
Tr., p. 5, L. 16 – p. 6, L. 1.)
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The state’s motion was heard the morning of trial. (Tr., pp. 4-18.) The
magistrate did not specifically hold whether he was affirming or denying the
motion, but he effectively denied the motion to the extent he allowed the parties
to bring up the stalking evidence, because he concluded the parties “have a right
to get into there’s a history between these folks, and they don’t like each other.”
(Tr., p. 9, Ls. 22-25.) The magistrate further determined that “you can say, you
know, that – that the mind set [Bobolack] carried was that there had been some
damage done to some of her property along the way, and she had a suspicion
that it was so and so that did it, and that’s all we’re going to do.” (Tr., p. 13,
Ls. 18-22.)
However, the magistrate also ruled that he would exclude police reports
related to the alleged stalking, and further reserved ruling on the limits of the
stalking evidence that he would allow. (See Tr., p. 14, Ls. 15-22; p. 17, L. 18 –
p. 18, L. 2.) He concluded that:
Now – so, I mean, I don’t know how – is that – this is one of those
things that I – I can’t really give you a definitive I’m going to allow
that question, not allow this question, as we – as we sit here right
now. I think I need to play it as we go.
But just so you both know, I think once the point’s been made that,
you know, there’s a level of distrust, or a level of fear, or whatever
back and forth here, then that’s as far as we need to get. And so,
that will be my judgment at the time.
(Tr., pp. 17, L. 18 – p. 18, L. 2.)
Bobolack was found guilty after trial. (Tr., p. 193, Ls.1-8.) She appealed
to the district court, arguing that the magistrate erred in “partially granting” the
state’s motion in limine, and that there was insufficient evidence to support the
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jury’s verdict. (R., pp. 79-82, 107-116.) The district court disagreed and affirmed
the judgment of conviction. (R., pp. 136-146.)
Bobolack timely appealed. (R., pp. 145-149.)
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ISSUES
Bobolack states the issues on appeal as:
A. Did the District Court err in affirming the trial court’s partial grant of the
State’s motion in limine excluding relevant evidence regarding the
relationship between Ms. Bobolack and Ms. Giambruno?
B. Did the District Court err in affirming the jury’s verdict?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 3)
The state rephrases the issues as:
I.

Has Bobolack failed to show the district court erred in affirming the
magistrate’s ruling on the state’s motion in limine?

II.

Has Bobolack failed to show the district court erred in affirming the jury’s
verdict?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Bobolack Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Affirming The
Magistrate Ruling On The State’s Motion In Limine
A.

Introduction
Bobolack argues on appeal that the district court “erred in affirming the

trial court’s [] partial grant of the State’s motion in limine excluding relevant
evidence regarding the relationship between Bobolack and Giambruno.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) Specifically, she contends that the trial court erroneously
excluded the stalking evidence, which was “relevant to [her] state of mind” during
the encounter with Giambruno. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6.) She further claims
the stalking evidence would have tended to show that she did not maliciously
and willfully disturb Giambruno’s peace. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6.)
This argument fails for several reasons. First, Bobolack has not shown
that the magistrate’s order was adverse to her, and therefore cannot show that
the order is subject to challenge on appeal. Second, even if the order was
adverse, Bobolack did not make an offer of proof of any evidence that was
actually excluded below, and thus has not preserved this issue for appeal. Third,
even if Bobolack has successfully preserved this issue on appeal, the magistrate
correctly limited the introduction of evidence pursuant to I.R.E. 403. Lastly, even
if the magistrate’s order was appealable and erroneous, it was harmless.
B.

Standard Of Review
This Court “directly review[s] the district court’s decision” when the district

court acts in its intermediate appellate capacity. State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709,
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711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho
670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)).

This Court reviews the magistrate record “to

determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the
magistrate’s findings of fact and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law
follow from those findings.” Id. “If those findings are so supported and the
conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate’s
decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] the district court’s decision as a matter of
procedure.” Id; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981).
Trial courts are afforded broad discretion when ruling on motions in limine.
Gunter v. Murphy’s Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16, 25, 105 P.3d 676, 685 (2005).
Consequently, this Court reviews decisions to grant or deny motions in limine
with an abuse of discretion standard. Id. Likewise, a “lower court’s determination
under I.R.E. 403 will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown to be an
abuse of discretion.” State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 86, 253 P.3d 754, 760
(Ct. App. 2011).
C.

Bobolack Has Failed To Show An Adverse Ruling Subject To Challenge
On Appeal
It is well settled “that in order for an issue to be raised on appeal, the

record must reveal an adverse ruling which forms the basis for an assignment of
error.” Krempasky v. Nez Perce Cty. Planning & Zoning, 150 Idaho 231, 236,
245 P.3d 983, 988 (2010); see also State v. Pickens, 148 Idaho 554, 557,
224 P.3d 1143, 1146 (Ct. App. 2010) (“In order for an issue to be raised on
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appeal, the record must reveal an adverse ruling that forms the basis for the
assignment of error.”).
The magistrate effectively denied the state’s motion in limine, which
sought “an Order precluding the defendant from producing any evidence related
to” the stalking allegations.

(R., p. 37.)

While the magistrate did not state

outright whether he was granting or denying the motion (see Tr., pp. 13-18), he
concluded that the bowling-alley incident did not “have to come up in a vacuum”
(Tr., p. 13, Ls. 7-8) and accordingly reasoned that allowing testimonial evidence
of stalking and vandalism would be appropriate:
I think, you know, either by way of cross-examination of
Ms. Giambruno or by direct testimony from your witness, I mean,
you can say, you know, that – that the mind set she carried was
that there had been some damage done to some of her property
along the way, and she had a suspicion that it was so and so that
did it, and that’s all we’re going to do.
(Tr., p. 13, Ls. 16-22.) The magistrate found that this sort of evidence should be
allowed, because “we have to let them give a flavor for who these people are
and where we – where they are,” and “you have a right to get into there’s a
history between these folks, and they don’t like each other.” (Tr., p. 9, Ls. 22-24;
p. 14, Ls. 4-6.)
The magistrate indicated limits on the stalking evidence he would allow,
by giving examples of the kind of in-depth testimony that he did not “want to get
into.” (Tr., p. 13, L. 23 – p. 14, L. 2.) The magistrate stated he would not allow
evidence as detailed as testimony that “[Bobolack] had a 7 – 17 inch scratch
mark on [her] car, June 2nd this happened, June 3rd this happened,” for
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example.1 (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 23-25.) But he also reserved ruling on precisely where
this limit would be, stating that “I can’t really give you a definitive I’m going to
allow that question, not allow this question, as we – as we sit here right now. I
think I need to play it as we go.” (Tr., p. 17, Ls. 19-22.) The magistrate thus
reserved ruling on the outer limits of what he would allow:
So, I’m going to judge it as we go along. But once I feel like the
points been made, then we’re going to shut that part down. I mean,
I’ll give you both some latitude to – to go back and forth on it, but
we’re not going to have, you know, a three-hour sub-trial on – on
who’s at fault in a – in a domestic situation gone bad. That’s not
going to be – that’s not on the table today, so.
(Tr., p. 14, Ls. 7-14.)
Bobolack’s challenge to the magistrate’s ruling fails at the outset because
she has not shown that it was adverse to her. The state sought to prevent the
production of “any evidence related to” the stalking allegations, and this request
was effectively denied, as the court plainly ruled that this evidence could be
introduced. (See, e.g., Tr., p. 13, Ls. 15-22.) While the magistrate also ruled
that police reports were to be excluded from evidence, Bobolack made no
discernible objection to excluding police reports at trial. (Tr., p. 14, Ls. 15-22.)
Lastly, the magistrate expressly reserved ruling on the limits of what it would
allow into evidence, finding that “I think I need to play it as we go.” (Tr., p. 17,
Ls. 18-22.) In sum, the magistrate’s pretrial ruling—consisting of an effective
denial of the state’s motion, a narrow exclusion that was uncontested at trial, and

1

These appear to be purely hypothetical examples, as there is no evidence in
the record connected with events in June. (See R.) Moreover, events in June
would have taken place more than two months after the altercation at issue.
(See R., p. 7.)
8

a reservation of further ruling—was not adverse to Bobolack, and is therefore not
appealable.
Bobolack characterizes the magistrate’s ruling as a “partial grant” of the
state’s motion, and contends that the magistrate “excluded specific evidence
supporting Ms. Bobolack’s characterization of her state of mind as one of fear
and standing up to a bully.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-5.) But this incorrectly
inverts the substance of what the court did: the magistrate expressly allowed
Bobolack to introduce the type of evidence the state wanted excluded, and
Bobolack indeed explored the stalking allegations at length at trial. (See, e.g.,
Tr., p. 13, Ls. 15-22; p. 126, L. 4 – p. 128, L. 23.) Moreover, Bobolack’s point
fails because she interprets a reservation of ruling as an adverse ruling. With
the unobjected-to exception of excluding actual police reports, the magistrate
reserved ruling on what evidence would be out-of-bounds, and that boundary line
was never meaningfully explored by the parties. Save for sustained objections
over alleged stalking acts that occurred after the incident at issue, the state did
not renew its objection to exclude the stalking evidence at trial.2 (See Tr., p. 129,
Ls. 14-24; p. 154, L. 16 – p. 155, L. 3; p. 160, L. 13 – p. 161, L. 9.)

2

Bobolack did not specifically claim in her offer of proof that she intended to
introduce evidence regarding Melissa Gayhart’s car, which was alleged to have
been vandalized after the bowling-alley incident. (See Tr., p. 10, L. 10 – p. 11,
L. 8.) At trial, the magistrate repeatedly sustained the state’s objection to
exclude testimony pertaining to post-incident stalking and vandalism.
(Tr., p. 129, Ls. 14-24; p. 154, L. 16 – p. 155, L. 3; p. 160, L. 13 – p. 161, L. 9.)
Though the state’s motion only sought to exclude alleged evidence of “the
Defendant’s property” being vandalized (R., p. 37), Bobolack appears to now
raise this issue on appeal, claiming that the magistrate erred by excluding “the
circumstances surrounding the vandalizing of Ms. [Gayhart’s] car.” (Appellant’s
brief, p. 6.) To the extent Bobolack means to challenge this ruling, that argument
9

As a result, Bobolack was able to present state-of-mind evidence, stalking
evidence, vandalism evidence, harassment evidence, death-threat evidence,
threats-to-pets evidence, damaged-radiator evidence, and more. (See, e.g., Tr.,
p. 126, L. 4 – p. 128, L. 23; p. 142, Ls. 2-17.) This testimony was elicited without
objection from the state, and the magistrate accordingly had no occasion to “shut
that part down.” Bobolack was successfully able to admit all of the pre-incident
stalking evidence her counsel inquired about, which shows that the magistrate
did not adversely rule to exclude this evidence, but simply reserved—but did not
exercise—his ability to limit its scope.
In sum, the magistrate effectively denied the state’s motion to the extent it
allowed the stalking evidence to come in, excluded police reports without
objection, and reserved ruling further on the scope of the stalking evidence.
Bobolack has not shown this ruling was adverse to her, and she consequently
cannot appeal from the magistrate’s ruling on the state’s motion in limine.

would fail, because she has not supported it on appeal—that is, she has not
explained, even assuming the relevance of pre-incident stalking, how alleged
stalking that occurred after the incident in question could also be relevant. See
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (“When issues on
appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will
not be considered . . . . A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority
or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking.”). Alternatively, to the extent
this argument has been preserved, it fails, because an alleged post-incident
encounter was necessarily irrelevant to Bobolack’s pre-incident state of mind,
and was correctly excluded at trial. See I.R.E. 401.
10

D.

Even If The Magistrate’s Ruling Was Adverse To Bobolack, She Failed To
Make An Offer Of Proof Of Any Evidence That Was Excluded At Trial,
And Therefore Failed To Preserve A Record For Appealing The
Magistrate’s Ruling
Parties may not predicate an error on a court’s decision to exclude

evidence “unless a substantial right of the party is affected,” and “the substance
of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the
context within which questions were asked.” I.R.E. 103. Generally speaking,
“[t]he purpose of an offer of proof is to make a record either for appeal or to
enable the court to rule on the admissibility of proffered evidence.” State v.
Joslin, 145 Idaho 75, 82, 175 P.3d 764, 771 (2007). Absent such an offer of
proof or a record-based indication of the relevancy of the excluded evidence, an
issue will not be preserved for appeal. See State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 120,
29 P.3d 949, 956 (2001) (citing Morris By & Through Morris v. Thomson,
130 Idaho 138, 143, 937 P.2d 1212, 1217 (1997) (“Plaintiff, however, did not
make an offer of proof regarding the testimony she intended to elicit from
Dr. Watkins on re-direct, and we thus do not have any basis on which to rule.”)).
In its motion to exclude the stalking evidence, the state noted that “[i]n an
offer of proof, it is expected that the defense will attempt to elicit testimony from
the Defendant or other witnesses that on prior occasions, the victim has stalked
the Defendant, harassed and/or threatened the Defendant, or vandalized the
Defendant’s property.” (R., p. 38.) Bobolack’s response elaborated that these
types of evidence were “closely related in that they revolve around the victim’s
actions, before and after the incident at issue, towards Ms. Bobolack’s ending a
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romantic relationship with a friend of the victim.” (R., p. 41.) Bobolack further
elaborated:
Ms. Bobolack acted without malice. Rather, Ms. Bobolack acted out
of self-preservation, attempting simply to put an end to the victim’s
constant harassment and stalking which was so pervasive that
Ms. Bobolack lived in a constant state of fear, a prisoner in her own
home. The “stalking” evidence makes it less probable that
Ms. Bobolack acted with the requisite specific intent of malice.
(R., p. 41.)
The magistrate pressed for more detail about this evidence while hearing
the motion in limine, essentially asking for an offer of proof: “[C]ertainly, you have
a right to get into there’s a history between these folks, and they don’t like each
other, or whatever is going on here, but tell me how deeply you propose to get
into that?” (Tr., p. 9, Ls. 22-25.) The magistrate reiterated he was not asking for
a “legal analysis,” but was rather asking Bobolack’s counsel “what is it that you
intend to inquire about.” (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 5-8.) Bobolack’s counsel responded:
The fact that the alleged victim is a – a close relation to
Ms. Bobolack’s ex, the fact that the alleged victim has made
physical threats against the defendant, has threatened to kill the –
defendant’s pets. It’s Ms. Bobolack’s testimony that during this
verbal altercation, the alleged victim made specific and repeated
reference to getting car number eight. Ms. Bobolack has had
exactly seven cars vandalized since she broke up with the alleged
victim’s acquaintance.
Very specific threats, Your Honor. There – there is so much more
going on here, and the State wants to draw a box around one –
one little incident here. There is so much more going on here, and
all of this goes to the frame of mind of the defendant, as far as – I
understand the State’s concern about not wanting to put on officer
testimony about the [veracity], necessarily, of Ms. Bobolack’s
accusations. But, Your Honor, they aren’t being offered at all for the
truth of the statement, per se. They absolutely go to Ms. Bobolack’s
mind frame on this day. And that is absolutely relevant where the
State has to prove that she acted with malice.
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Her mind frame on this day is one of self-preservation, is one of
fear, and that is absolutely relevant.
(Tr., p. 10, L. 10 – p. 11, L. 8.)
Here, regardless of whether the magistrate’s ruling was adverse to
Bobolack, she has not preserved a challenge to it on appeal, because every
factual area she proposed delving into prior to trial, was ultimately discussed, at
length, at trial. Accordingly, she did not make an offer of proof of any evidence
that was actually excluded at trial.
All of the evidence Bobolack stated she intended to inquire about was
presented at trial. To summarize, Bobolack testified at trial that: Giambruno said
“[w]e can’t wait until we get our hands on vehicle number eight” (Tr., p. 123,
Ls. 21-24); that Bobolack had seven cars previously vandalized, and she
suspected Giambruno was responsible (Tr., p. 124, Ls. 3-5; p. 141, L. 21 –
p. 142, L. 4); that Bobolack ended a relationship with a friend of Giambruno
(Tr,. p. 137, Ls. 1-13); that Giambruno threatened to kill her pets (Tr., p. 126,
Ls. 13-16; p. 138, Ls. 15-17); that Giambruno threatened to kill her five times
(Tr., p. 137, L. 24 – p. 138, L. 1); that she was stalked by Giambruno (Tr., p. 138,
Ls. 7-12); that for over four years she had left grocery stores, parks, and movie
theaters to avoid Giambruno (Tr., p. 139, Ls. 20-24); that she lived in fear of
Giambruno (Tr., p. 140, Ls. 18-23); that she called police 90 times regarding
various threats (Tr., p. 141, Ls. 1-3); that she possessed videotape evidence of
Giambruno’s vandalism and harassment (Tr., p. 141, Ls. 24 – p. 142, L. 7); that
Giambruno was part of a group that “sever[ed] my radiator” (Tr., p. 142, Ls. 1217); and that Bobolack feared for her life (Tr., p. 144, Ls. 19-24).
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Bobolack’s other witness similarly testified that she allegedly heard
Giambruno threaten to kill Bobolack (Tr., p. 159, Ls. 12-21); that Bobolack lived
in fear from Giambruno—fearful for her cars, friends, family members, and pets
(Tr., p. 154, Ls. 1-15); and that the witness had “called the Meridian Police
Department” regarding the aforementioned death threat (Tr., p. 159, Ls. 19-23).
Moreover, Bobolack did not simply allude to or summarize these
allegations—she testified about them at length and in great detail:
Q [from defense counsel]. Had you ever had a car vandalized
before you broke up with Ms. Dickson?
A [from Bobolack]. No.
Q. Has Ms. Giambruno threatened to kill you?
A. Yes, she has, on five occasions.
Q. Is Ms. Giambruno stalking you?
A. She has. And I believe that – you know, that was just an
altercation at the – at the bowling alley just to be a bully.
Q. Has Ms. Giambruno threatened to kill your dogs?
A. She’s threatened to do a lot, and my dogs is one of them.
Q. How many dogs do you have?
A. Four.
Q. Do you have children?
A. No.
Q. Are your dogs your children?
A. Yes, they are.
Q. Do you live in fear that Ms. Giambruno will harm your pets?
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A. Yes, I do. I stay regularly; I limit myself of going anywhere.
Q. Do you limit your life and calendar out of fear of what
Ms. Giambruno might do to your pets?
A. Not just Ms. Giambruno, but Robin Dickson, and Rory Brewer
and them, yes.
Q. Do you fear that Ms. Giambruno will harm your property?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you fear that Mr. [sic] Giambruno will harm your family?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you feel you live as a prisoner because of the potential harm
that Ms. Giambruno can inflict?
A. After 4.5 years being harassed by this group, I do. And I fear for
Melissa and her children as well.
Q. Are you fearful when you leave your home?
A. Yes. I have really high anxiety. And right now, my animals are
being watched while I’ve been here all day.
Q. Have you called the police regarding Ms. Giambruno?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. How many times?
A. I’d probably say 90 in the last 4.5 years, over threats and – and
being harassed.
Q. Have the police ever come to you to investigate further?
A. They said that they have, but they didn’t even give me a report
number.
…
Q. Why did you yell at Ms. Giambruno?
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A. Because I felt that there was no other way. I felt like I had to
stand my ground and tell her to leave me alone. I’ve had enough.
Somebody’s stalking you for 4.5 years, what do you do? When the
police don’t do nothing about seven vandalizing, stalking your
home, and you’ve moved five times, and this same group comes at
you at all five homes, what do you do? Enough’s enough.
I have the right just like everybody else, underneath the
Constitution, I have a right to a peaceful and safeful [sic] dwelling,
and be not harassed. But that’s not the case. I’ve lived like this for
4.5 years, like a prisoner, because of this group.
(Tr., p. 126, L. 4 – p.128, L. 23 (brackets altered).)
In sum, all of the stalking evidence that Bobolack identified prior to trial
was ultimately heard at trial—repeatedly, and in detail. Bobolack was able to
delve into a four-year history of her side of the story, and testify regarding every
incident and category of stalking evidence she identified in her offer of proof. As
a result, she has failed to show that there was any evidence she presented as an
offer of proof that was actually excluded at trial.
Bobolack contends that the magistrate permitted only “limited inquiry into
Ms. Bobolack’s general state of mind,” and claims it was an error to exclude
“specific factual underpinnings” of that state of mind. (Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)
This argument fails, as the magistrate plainly allowed Bobolack and her witness
to testify both about her state of mind and the many alleged specific facts that
underpinned it—a cornucopia of allegations that included vandalized cars, a
breakup, living in fear, being stalked, living as a prisoner in her own home,
endangered pets, dozens of unheeded police calls, death threats, a severed
radiator, and videotaped vandalism. (Tr., p. 126, L. 4 – p. 128, L. 23; p. 137,
L. 24 – p. 144, L. 24.)
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Bobolack also argues that “[i]t is far different to be limited to stating ‘I have
been bullied[,’] as opposed to being able to relate a story, a narrative, of the
incidents of bullying, of the actual root causes of the fear.” (Appellant’s brief,
p. 6.)

The problem with this scenario is it ponders the opposite of what

happened here. The magistrate did not constrain Bobolack to stating “I have
been bullied,” nor did it prevent her from relating the story, narrative, and
incidents that she alleged informed her mental state. (See Tr., p. 126, L. 4 –
p. 128, L. 23; p. 137, L. 24 – p. 144, L. 24.)
To the contrary, the magistrate allowed Bobolack and her witness to
present a detailed narrative discussing the alleged underlying incidents, which
they did. The narrative was exhaustive. By the time it concluded, the jury heard
allegations of how many times Bobolack’s car had been vandalized, how many
death threats had been made, how many homes Bobolack had lived in with
Giambruno “com[ing] at [her],” how many times police had been called, how
many fearful years had transpired, the exact kind of vandalism that was inflicted
on Bobolack’s radiator, whether Bobolack had video taped some of the stalking
evidence, whether Bobolack’s pets were being watched during the trial for their
own safety, and for good measure, precisely how many dogs Bobolack owned.
(See Tr.,p. 126, L. 4 – p. 128, L. 23; p. 137, L. 24 – p. 144, L. 24.) Bobolack was
not remotely limited to testifying solely about state-of-mind evidence, but was
permitted to testify to fact after abundant fact supporting her state of mind.
In sum, all the evidence that Bobolack identified in her offer of proof was
ultimately admitted. Because she did not make an offer of proof showing any
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evidence that was excluded, she has not preserved her challenge to the
magistrate’s ruling on the motion in limine.
E.

Alternatively, Even If The Magistrate’s Ruling Was Adverse And Properly
Preserved For Review, The District Court Correctly Affirmed The
Magistrate’s Decision To Exclude Evidence That Was Unfairly Prejudicial,
Confusing, Or Needlessly Cumulative
To analyze whether evidence is admissible under I.R.E. 403, courts must

perform a balancing test and ask “whether the danger of unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence.”

State v. Grist,

147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009). Specifically, “[a]lthough relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.” I.R.E. 403. If a piece of evidence’s potential for “unfair
prejudice” substantially outweighs its probative value, it can be excluded.
I.R.E. 403.

“Unfair prejudice” is the tendency to suggest a decision on an

improper basis. See State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 720, 722
(2010).
Here, the state sought to exclude the stalking evidence because even
assuming its relevance, “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice and the danger of confusing the issues and/or
misleading the jury.”3 (R., p. 39.)

3

The state also sought to exclude the evidence as irrelevant per I.R.E. 402.
(R., pp. 38-39.)
18

To the extent the magistrate’s ruling limiting potential testimony was
adverse to Bobolack, it appears that the ruling was grounded in Rule 403
concerns. The magistrate was adamant that,
I’ll give [the parties] some latitude to – to go back and forth on [the
issue of the stalking evidence], but we’re not going to have, you
know, a three-hour sub-trial on – on who’s at fault in a – in a
domestic situation gone bad. That’s not going to be – that’s not on
the table today, so.
(Tr., p. 14, Ls. 9-14.) On intermediate appeal, the district court affirmed this
basis for the magistrate’s ruling:
It is clear that the trial judge’s ruling was intended to avoid a
subordinate trial on each of the claimed wrongs towards the
appellant allegedly committed by the victim in this case. In fact, as
the trial progressed the history of ill will sought to explain the
appellant’s state of mind was revealed. The trial judge’s expressed
intent to avoid seven or more mini trials within the trial while
allowing exposure of the underlying claims was achieved.
(R., p. 138.)
The magistrate correctly concluded that stalking evidence testimony
should at some point be limited, in order to avoid conducting sub-trials; or in
other words, to avoid undue prejudice, confusion, or wasting time.

Even

assuming for the sake of argument that stalking evidence would be relevant to
Bobolack’s state of mind, she was already allowed to present copious stalking
evidence at trial. (See, e.g., Tr., p. 126, L. 4 – p. 128, L. 23; p. 137, L. 24 –
p. 144, L. 24; p. 153, L. 23 – p. 154, L. 15; p. 159, Ls. 12-23.) Bobolack was
given the ability to explore these issues in detail, and to allow further stalking
evidence, without limitation, would go precisely where the magistrate wanted to
avoid—into trials within the trial over specific alleged instances of vandalism
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occurring on specific dates in time. Sub-trials would have been self-evidently
confusing, wasteful, time-consuming, and prejudicial, especially given that
Bobolack ably made her point that she was afraid of Giambruno, and adduced
facts to support it.

Even assuming the magistrate’s ruling was adverse to

Bobolack, the outer limits set by the magistrate were proper. Bobolack thus fails
to show that the magistrate’s ruling on the motion in limine was incorrect.
F.

Alternatively, Even Assuming The Magistrate’s Ruling Was Adverse,
Properly Preserved For Review, And Erroneous, The Error Was Harmless
Finally, even if the magistrate erred by ruling on the state’s motion in

limine, any such error was harmless. “Error may not be predicated upon a ruling
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected ….” I.R.E. 103(a). “Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which
does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” I.C.R. 52. “An error is
harmless if a reviewing court can find beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury
would have reached the same result without the admission of the challenged
evidence.”

State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 887, 119 P.3d 653, 662

(Ct. App. 2005).
Here, Bobolack was able to adduce substantial, detailed testimonial
evidence alleging living in fear of Giambruno, being stalked by Giambruno,
fearing for her life, fearing for her family’s and friends’ and pets’ safety, calling
the police 90 times, having her property vandalized, moving from home to home
with the “same group” coming at her, resorting to having “my animals [] being
watched” during the trial itself, and living like a prisoner in her own home—and
yet was still found guilty of disturbing the peace. (Tr., p. 126, L. 4 – p. 128, L. 23;

20

p. 137, L. 24 – p. 144, L. 24; p. 193, Ls. 5-8.) Bobolack has not made any
showing that the production of more of the exact same allegations—except with
more detail—would have made a difference in the jury’s verdict, given the
testimony it had already heard.
Further, Bobolack herself diminishes the magnitude of any error when she
concludes that whether the stalking allegations even occurred is irrelevant—she
states that “[t]he veracity of these allegations was not relevant, because such
allegations formed the basis of Ms. Bobolack’s state of mind with regard to
Ms. Giambruno, whether the allegations were actually true or false.” (Appellant’s
brief, p. 6; see also Tr., p. 11, Ls. 1-3.)
If that is the case—if stalking evidence would only be relevant insofar as it
“formed the basis” of Bobolack’s state of mind—then the exclusion of additional
stalking evidence would necessarily be harmless. As it happened, Bobolack
already produced ample factual allegations to support her state-of-mind
argument.

Accordingly, excluding further cumulative allegations—whose

relevance stemmed not from whether they actually happened, but from their
effect on Bobolack’s already-supported state of mind—would be a harmless
error, if error at all.
Here, even if the magistrate’s ruling was adverse to Bobolack, properly
preserved on appeal, and erroneous, any such error would be harmless.
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II.
Bobolack Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Affirming The Jury’s
Verdict
A.

Introduction
Bobolack argues that “[t]he jury’s verdict was unsupported by sufficient

evidence.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) She points to her own testimony “that she
was not willfully attempting to inflict harm on Ms. Giambruno,” and contends
there is insufficient evidence that she “acted with the requisite willful malice.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)
This argument fails, as there was ample evidence from which the jury
could conclude that Bobolack maliciously and willfully disturbed Giambruno’s
peace or quiet. The district court correctly affirmed that conclusion.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence is limited in scope.” State

v. Marsh, 153 Idaho 360, 365, 283 P.3d 107, 112 (Ct. App. 2011). Idaho’s
appellate courts will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury
verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v.
Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). In conducting this review
the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the
credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292,
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955 P.2d at 607; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001
(Ct. App. 1991). Furthermore, the facts and inferences to be drawn from those
facts are construed “in the light most favorable to the prosecution.”

Miller,

131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d
1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987).
C.

There Was Sufficient Evidence That Bobolack Maliciously And Willfully
Disturbed The Peace
Idaho Code § 18-6409(1) sets forth the elements of disturbing the peace:
(1) Every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the peace or
quiet of any neighborhood, family or person, by loud or unusual
noise, or by tumultuous or offensive conduct, or by threatening,
traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight or fighting, or fires any
gun or pistol, or uses any vulgar, profane or indecent language
within the presence or hearing of children, in a loud and boisterous
manner, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Here, Bobolack was charged with “willfully and maliciously disturb[ing] the

peace or quiet of a person, Sara Giambruno, by engaging in offensive conduct in
a loud and boisterous manner.” (R., pp. 44-45.) She was found guilty after a
jury trial, and the district court reviewed the facts adduced at trial on intermediate
appeal. (R., pp. 139-142.) After doing so the district court concluded that:
In essence the jury was presented with differing versions of what
transpired during the incident. It appears the jury credited the
testimony of the witnesses for the State and did not believe the
witnesses for the defense, including the appellant’s assertion that
her only motivation in yelling at Ms. Giambruno was “to get her to
stop.” The jury’s guilty verdict is supported by substantial evidence
and will not be second guessed.
(R., p. 143.)
The district court correctly affirmed the jury verdict, as there was ample
evidence that Bobolack maliciously and willfully disturbed Giambruno’s peace or
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quiet. Giambruno testified that as she left her apartment with her son, Bobolack
began yelling and screaming at her from across the street. (Tr., p. 54, Ls. 4-11.)
Giambruno testified that Bobolack “was calling me you fat bitch, and I had it
coming, and that she was going to kick my ass.”

(Tr., p. 56, Ls. 19-23.)

Giamburno testified that Bobolack was “yelling and her arms were waving,” and
that she believed that Bobolack was looking for an altercation, and appeared
aggressive. (Tr., p. 57, Ls. 11-13; p. 58, Ls. 2-3, 14-17.) An eyewitness testified
that “[t]here was two females out in the parking lot, and one was yelling at the
other one.” (Tr., p. 69, L. 23 – p. 70, L. 1.) He testified that only one woman was
yelling, and that the woman he observed yelling was Bobolack. (Tr., p. 70, Ls. 48; p. 76, Ls. 1-8.) The eyewitness further testified that Bobolack was “yelling
pretty much at the top of her voice,” “bad mouthing the other lady, calling her a
lot of profanities.”

(Tr., p. 70, Ls. 16-22.)

He testified that Bobolack called

Giambruno “a bitch, called her a cunt; pretty much it was all just cuss – cuss
words all the way across.” (Tr., p. 70, L. 25 – p. 71, L. 2.) Moreover, he testified
that Bobolack made threatening statements; “[s]he’d made the comment to come
back and talk to her, kind of – I think she said, come on, bitch, as in like come
back and talk to her.” (Tr., p. 71, Ls. 3-11.) He concluded that Bobolack “just
kept yelling and screaming,” whereas Giambruno “was just walking away,” and
estimated that Bobolack was yelling at Giambruno from three to five minutes.
(Tr., p. 71, Ls. 13-15; p. 72, Ls. 3-6, 16-20.) Simply put, there was substantial
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evidence supporting the jury’s verdict that Bobolack disturbed the peace.4
Bobolack argues that this verdict was unsupported, and contends her own
testimony regarding her mental state was “uncontroverted.” (Appellant’s brief,
p. 8.) She in particular cites her own testimony:
Ms. Bobolack testified unequivocally that she was not willfully
attempting to inflict harm on Ms. Giambruno:
Q: Were you trying to inflict harm on Ms. Giambruno?
A: No.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7 (citing Tr., p. 128, L. 24 – p. 129, L. 1).)
This argument fails. Testimony from Bobolack, favorable though it may
be to her case, does not negate the substantial evidence before the jury that she
alone was aggressively screaming and yelling at Giambruno for minutes on end,
swearing at her, and threatening her.

Bobolack points out evidence that

supports her story, but does not show an absence of evidence on the other side,
let alone meaningfully address the evidence that she maliciously and willfully
disturbed the peace.

The jury had substantial evidence to conclude that

Bobolack was guilty of disturbing the peace and the district court correctly
affirmed the same.

4

Moreover, “direct evidence of intent is not required.” See State v. Mitchell,
146 Idaho 378, 384, 195 P.3d 737, 743 (Ct. App. 2008). Per Mitchell, intent “may
be shown by circumstantial evidence, or proven by the defendant’s acts and
conduct.” Id.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the
district court.
DATED this 6th day of October, 2016.
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